The ultimate Middle East missile target: Nuclear reactors

 

The following is an excerpt:

What if a nuclear reactor had been the target of last month’s accurate missile attack on Saudi Arabian oil facilities? We might now be mopping up a Middle East Chernobyl. The lesson should be clear: Don’t build more large reactors in the region. They’re radioactive sitting ducks.

Saudi Arabia has plans to build an array of large nuclear power plants. Next door, the United Arab Emirates is spending $20 billion to complete four commercial reactors at Barakah. Egypt and Turkey both have begun constructing two massive Russian-designed nuclear power plants. Meanwhile, Iran has two operating reactors and has begun constructing two more. After Iran’s Sept. 14 missile attack against Saudi Arabia, though, all of these plants risk being wiped out.

Precision guided missiles are the reason why.

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Read Mark and Henry’s piece in the Washington Examiner here.

Mark Dubowitz on the Journal Editorial Report

Paul: Mark Dubowitz is chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Welcome back, Mark. Nice to see you again.

Mark: Thank you, Paul.

Paul: So the President called it an amazing outcome, everybody’s happy, how do you see it?

Mark: Well Paul, I wish it was true, but I don’t think that’s correct. I mean, first of all, I don’t think the Kurds are happy. I think the United States has, once again, abandoned them to potential slaughter. I think that it’s true the Russians, the Iranians, and Bashar al-Assad in Syria are happy because they are now going to extend their control over the country. But I think for the U.S. allies and for U.S. partners around the world, I think the United States has reinforced a warning from Qasem Soleimani, Iran’s Kuds force leader, that America always abandons its friends.

Paul: Well, let’s talk about the cease fire specifically because this is now said to have created at least a space for the Kurds to be able to get out of that zone where the Turks are shelling and then give some time to negotiate a larger agreement that will protect that Kurds and also protect the Turkish interest interests. Is there a chance that that happens?

Mark: Well I just think it’s a lot more difficult, Paul, now to do that than it was a couple of weeks ago. I mean, a couple of weeks ago we had U.S. special forces on the ground working closely with the Kurds, we had U.S. air power there, we were controlling a part of Syria with most of Syria’s oil reserves, so that gave us leverage in any of the negotiations we were going to have with the Russians and with the Assad regime, and we were in a position of, I think, U.S. influence. Now we’ve withdrawn those U.S special forces, the Kurds are withdrawn, they’re on the run, and Assad and the Russians are moving into that territory. So, unfortunately, I think we’re in a worse position right now with less leverage to negotiate any kind of agreement or settlement on this issue.

Paul: Now the President said that Erdogan, the president of Turkey, made this concession on the suspension of hostilities for five days because of the potential damage from the economic sanctions and other sanctions that the president announced. I guess, is that true? And why did Erdogan give this five-day reprieve, if that’s what it is?

Mark: Well I think Erdogan actually realized that he’s getting everything he wants. I think he was also facing significant resistance from the Kurds and probably realized that he wasn’t able to push further south given the Kurdish military forces there. So instead, he took the five day pause which is really not a cease-fire, it’s an opportunity for him to consolidate his gains. And let’s also face it, the sanctions that the president had imposed on Turkey and on Erdogan were not very effective. They had very little impact. In fact, he president has been resisting tough sanctions that congress has put in place over the years.

Paul: So Erdogan did this as a kind of, if he’s getting what he wants, is what you argue with, and the president and the United States isn’t getting all that much. What about the sanctions that are being developed in the Senate? There was a huge bipartisan vote, as you know, in the house, it’s a non-binding resolution, but still. Republicans, two-to-one joined Democrats to condemn the President’s withdrawal. In the senate there are some really stiff sanctions. Lindsay Graham’s bill with Chris Van Hollen and several democrats being put together that would target Erdogan specifically, do you think Erdogan is a little worried about that?

Mark: well, they are definitely tough sanctions, you’re right there. I don’t think he’s worried because I think he thinks the president will do what he’s done in the past, which is stonewall any congressional sanctions. You’ve got to remember, there were sanctions passed a number of years ago that would impose top sanctions on turkey if it bought the S-400, the Russian air defense system. Turkey went ahead, bought the S-400 and President trump has blocked those sanctions from being imposed. So, I think Erdogan assumes he’s got the presidents number, he rolled them once, hell roll them again, and the president will stand in the way of any congressional efforts.

Paul: you might be right, Erdogan might be right, but I don’t know this time. You know, I talked to one senator this week who said there may be 80 votes in the senate for this kind of action. Now this is obviously before the president would lean on some republicans, but I don’t know, this might be a little different.

Mark: yeah, Paul, the only problem is, I mean you can pass a veto-proof majority bill and you can have sanctions that are in place, but at the end of the day, the president may have national interest waivers, you can waive sanctions, he also can instruct the state department, treasury department not to enforce those sanctions. So they may be tough sanctions that end up sitting in a drawer collecting dust.

Paul: okay, so where do we go from here? Is this kind of just consolidation now, mopping up operations by Erdogan and the Kurds are going to have to cut a deal with Assad and there’s no way to retrieve this situation?

Mark: look, I think we’re going to try to mitigate the damage. I think vice president pence and secretary Pompeo and the military are doing everything they can to mitigate the damage, but the president has put them in a really tough predicament and unfortunately, it’s his decision-making process. I mean, instead of actually going through a methodical process having everything in place, having the pentagon with contingency plans, consulting with our allies, explaining this decision to the American people, he went ahead on a phone call and a tweet and once again made a very impulsive decision. Now everybody is scrambling to try and minimize the consequences.

Paul: very briefly, mark, what do you think of the president’s invitation to Erdogan to come to the white house?

Mark: well, it think it’s the wrong invitation at the wrong time and I would invite the leaders of the Kurds and the leaders of the Syria democratic forces to the white house to thank them for losing 11,000 men and women in the fight against ISIS to save American lives and protect the homeland.

Paul: All right, Mark Dubowitz, thanks for coming in.

Angry At Trump’s Syria-Withdrawal? He Learned His Foreign Policy From Obama

Gigot: Let’s start with the European statement this week. How significant is it about Iran policy?

Dubowitz: I think it’s very significant. As you know and the viewers know, the Europeans have been opposing the Trump policy of walking away from the Iran deal and imposing maximum pressure but because of the Iranian strikes against Saudi oil facilities, which really is an attack on global energy supplies on which the world depends, they are moving closer to the President’s position and I think this is a reminder to the Iranians that they will be increasingly isolated if they continue their malign activities.

Gigot: So this basically takes off the table any of the ideas of providing tax credits that the French president had had for Iran to help them get over sanctions. But what needs to happen now from the Europeans if we really want to continue to pressure Iran. What should they do next?

Dubowitz: Well I actually think, Paul, they’re going to continue to try to convince President Trump to offer sanctions relief in some form.

Gigot: Okay.

Dubowitz: :Yeah, I think the French are not going to give up on this, they’ve floated this idea of a 15 billion dollar credit facility that the Iranians can draw down on, which needs US permission in order to operate. I think they’ll continue to try to push this idea, to give the Iranians sanctions relief to come back to the table but I think what the Europeans really need to do is send a stark warning to the Iranians that if they continue to escalate on the nuclear side, the Europeans are going to walk away from the nuclear deal and if they continue striking at global energy resources and infrastructure, the Europeans are going to snap back their own sanctions.

Gigot: Is the President likely to take that invitation from the French even after the strike on the oil facilities, I mean the President was looking to really talk to Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, at this UN meeting but it didn’t happen.

Dubowitz: It didn’t happen and it’s a good thing it didn’t happen, and I certainly think that the President isn’t going to allow himself to be blackmailed by the regime in Iran and offer them billions of dollars merely for the opportunity to come back to the table. So I hope that the President sticks to his guns and makes it very clear that unless Iran comes back to the table to negotiate a comprehensive agreement, based on the President’s terms, then the maximum pressure campaign is going to intensify.

Gigot: I was at a media breakfast this week with Rouhani, with several members of the press, and he was asked about negotiations with Trump, and he said “we will not negotiate unles the sanctions are lifted.” Of course, when you lift the sanctions then they have less incentive to cooperate. So, do you see any bend in the Iranian position from here?

Dubowitz: I see some bend because I think the Iranians recognize that they are facing imminent economic collapse.

Gigot: It’s that bad? That’s a fairly forceful statement – imminent economic collapse?

Dubowitz: Yeah, I think the Iranians are in a situation where they are running out of foreign exchange reserves, they’re not going to have the money to pay for imports that they need to run their factories, with factories closing they’re going to have massive unemployment, and so their situation is getting worse every day. And I think the administration, with a few moves, could actually bring about that kind of economic collapse which will then put the regime in a position where they’ll have to choose between negotiations and the survival of its regime.

Gigot: Now one of those actions is so called snapback sanctions which were part of the original 2015 deal but that involves the United Nations, does it not? Explain how that would work and what it would mean?

Dubowitz: So the way it works is under the Obama nuclear deal, the one good thing that the President negotiated at the time was a unilateral snapback, the ability of the United States to unilaterally snapback UN sanctions against opposition from Russia, China, or even Europe. So the United States can still move unilaterally to snapback those UN sanctions. And that’s important because it would bring back all the security council resolutions, it would force the Europeans to have to comply with these UN sanctions, and Asian countries, and it would isolate Iran politically but also it would do something, Paul, very important.  There’s still about $5 billion dollars’ worth of Iranian-European trade this year. If you could shut down $5 billion dollars’ worth of trade, then you’re essentially in the position I mentioned earlier, where they can’t buy essential goods from the Germans, and the Italians, and the Dutch that they need to run their economy, sophisticated machinery that they need for their factories. You get rid of 5 billion euros of trade, and you’re putting Iran closer to that position of economic collapse.

Gigot: Just so I understand, this unilateral decision, just one country, the United States, could call for the snapback? It couldn’t be vetoed by China, couldn’t be vetoed by Russia and other Security Council members?

Dubowitz: That’s correct, it’s a unilateral snapback against the opposition of those countries. I think the Obama administration at the time wisely understood they were never going to get Chinese and Russian support so they negotiated a unilateral snapback. Now some are saying the United States can’t do that alone because the United States has walked away from the JCPOA. That is not the administration’s position in terms of the legal interpretation of that snapback.

Gigot: I guess the question is, if you’re talking about maximum pressure, why hasn’t the administration done this so far?

Dubowitz: I think there’s an internal debate about whether this is the time to impose that snapback, because essentially when you impose that snapback the Iranians walk away from the nuclear deal, everybody walks away from the nuclear deal, it’s dead and it’s buried and then you’ve got to deal with the fallout from that and part of the fallout would be continued Iranian nuclear escalation and you’ve got to be prepared for that.

Gigot: Thank you  Mark Dubowitz, appreciate it.

Stand up to Iran’s oil market terrorism

 

The following is an excerpt:

Looking ahead, there are three main lessons to learn from Saturday’s attack. First, Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure is vulnerable, a weakness common to many other oil installations around the globe. Many of these installations are operated by commercial companies, whose coordination with government defense and security forces is often quite poor.

Second, even though it has rapidly risen to become the world’s top oil producer, the U.S. is not immune to the effects of higher oil prices, including a possible global recession. American oil-producing regions like Texas, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania among others will get an economic boost from the price surge, yet many Americans will be worse off. Sustained high oil prices frequently trigger recession. The only factor that has held the oil price from jumping even higher seems to be the weak global demand for oil, itself a sign of a potential emerging recession.

Third, the attack underscores a reality too often ignored by President Trump: only the U.S. military can guarantee the free flow of Middle Eastern energy to the global market. Washington’s allies can and should do more to help, but American forces are in a class of their own. Plus, taking the lead is in America’s interest, because a global recession will hit the U.S. economy hard.

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Read Mark and Brenda’s piece for the Washington Examiner here.