Mark Dubowitz on the Journal Editorial Report

Paul: Mark Dubowitz is chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Welcome back, Mark. Nice to see you again.

Mark: Thank you, Paul.

Paul: So the President called it an amazing outcome, everybody’s happy, how do you see it?

Mark: Well Paul, I wish it was true, but I don’t think that’s correct. I mean, first of all, I don’t think the Kurds are happy. I think the United States has, once again, abandoned them to potential slaughter. I think that it’s true the Russians, the Iranians, and Bashar al-Assad in Syria are happy because they are now going to extend their control over the country. But I think for the U.S. allies and for U.S. partners around the world, I think the United States has reinforced a warning from Qasem Soleimani, Iran’s Kuds force leader, that America always abandons its friends.

Paul: Well, let’s talk about the cease fire specifically because this is now said to have created at least a space for the Kurds to be able to get out of that zone where the Turks are shelling and then give some time to negotiate a larger agreement that will protect that Kurds and also protect the Turkish interest interests. Is there a chance that that happens?

Mark: Well I just think it’s a lot more difficult, Paul, now to do that than it was a couple of weeks ago. I mean, a couple of weeks ago we had U.S. special forces on the ground working closely with the Kurds, we had U.S. air power there, we were controlling a part of Syria with most of Syria’s oil reserves, so that gave us leverage in any of the negotiations we were going to have with the Russians and with the Assad regime, and we were in a position of, I think, U.S. influence. Now we’ve withdrawn those U.S special forces, the Kurds are withdrawn, they’re on the run, and Assad and the Russians are moving into that territory. So, unfortunately, I think we’re in a worse position right now with less leverage to negotiate any kind of agreement or settlement on this issue.

Paul: Now the President said that Erdogan, the president of Turkey, made this concession on the suspension of hostilities for five days because of the potential damage from the economic sanctions and other sanctions that the president announced. I guess, is that true? And why did Erdogan give this five-day reprieve, if that’s what it is?

Mark: Well I think Erdogan actually realized that he’s getting everything he wants. I think he was also facing significant resistance from the Kurds and probably realized that he wasn’t able to push further south given the Kurdish military forces there. So instead, he took the five day pause which is really not a cease-fire, it’s an opportunity for him to consolidate his gains. And let’s also face it, the sanctions that the president had imposed on Turkey and on Erdogan were not very effective. They had very little impact. In fact, he president has been resisting tough sanctions that congress has put in place over the years.

Paul: So Erdogan did this as a kind of, if he’s getting what he wants, is what you argue with, and the president and the United States isn’t getting all that much. What about the sanctions that are being developed in the Senate? There was a huge bipartisan vote, as you know, in the house, it’s a non-binding resolution, but still. Republicans, two-to-one joined Democrats to condemn the President’s withdrawal. In the senate there are some really stiff sanctions. Lindsay Graham’s bill with Chris Van Hollen and several democrats being put together that would target Erdogan specifically, do you think Erdogan is a little worried about that?

Mark: well, they are definitely tough sanctions, you’re right there. I don’t think he’s worried because I think he thinks the president will do what he’s done in the past, which is stonewall any congressional sanctions. You’ve got to remember, there were sanctions passed a number of years ago that would impose top sanctions on turkey if it bought the S-400, the Russian air defense system. Turkey went ahead, bought the S-400 and President trump has blocked those sanctions from being imposed. So, I think Erdogan assumes he’s got the presidents number, he rolled them once, hell roll them again, and the president will stand in the way of any congressional efforts.

Paul: you might be right, Erdogan might be right, but I don’t know this time. You know, I talked to one senator this week who said there may be 80 votes in the senate for this kind of action. Now this is obviously before the president would lean on some republicans, but I don’t know, this might be a little different.

Mark: yeah, Paul, the only problem is, I mean you can pass a veto-proof majority bill and you can have sanctions that are in place, but at the end of the day, the president may have national interest waivers, you can waive sanctions, he also can instruct the state department, treasury department not to enforce those sanctions. So they may be tough sanctions that end up sitting in a drawer collecting dust.

Paul: okay, so where do we go from here? Is this kind of just consolidation now, mopping up operations by Erdogan and the Kurds are going to have to cut a deal with Assad and there’s no way to retrieve this situation?

Mark: look, I think we’re going to try to mitigate the damage. I think vice president pence and secretary Pompeo and the military are doing everything they can to mitigate the damage, but the president has put them in a really tough predicament and unfortunately, it’s his decision-making process. I mean, instead of actually going through a methodical process having everything in place, having the pentagon with contingency plans, consulting with our allies, explaining this decision to the American people, he went ahead on a phone call and a tweet and once again made a very impulsive decision. Now everybody is scrambling to try and minimize the consequences.

Paul: very briefly, mark, what do you think of the president’s invitation to Erdogan to come to the white house?

Mark: well, it think it’s the wrong invitation at the wrong time and I would invite the leaders of the Kurds and the leaders of the Syria democratic forces to the white house to thank them for losing 11,000 men and women in the fight against ISIS to save American lives and protect the homeland.

Paul: All right, Mark Dubowitz, thanks for coming in.

Stand up to Iran’s oil market terrorism

 

The following is an excerpt:

Looking ahead, there are three main lessons to learn from Saturday’s attack. First, Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure is vulnerable, a weakness common to many other oil installations around the globe. Many of these installations are operated by commercial companies, whose coordination with government defense and security forces is often quite poor.

Second, even though it has rapidly risen to become the world’s top oil producer, the U.S. is not immune to the effects of higher oil prices, including a possible global recession. American oil-producing regions like Texas, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania among others will get an economic boost from the price surge, yet many Americans will be worse off. Sustained high oil prices frequently trigger recession. The only factor that has held the oil price from jumping even higher seems to be the weak global demand for oil, itself a sign of a potential emerging recession.

Third, the attack underscores a reality too often ignored by President Trump: only the U.S. military can guarantee the free flow of Middle Eastern energy to the global market. Washington’s allies can and should do more to help, but American forces are in a class of their own. Plus, taking the lead is in America’s interest, because a global recession will hit the U.S. economy hard.

[…]

Read Mark and Brenda’s piece for the Washington Examiner here. 

Stop Indulging Javad Zarif

There’s nothing ‘moderate’ about the Iranian foreign minister, who is now threatening our think tank.

 

The following is an excerpt:

Now we find ourselves in Mr. Zarif’s sights. The Foreign Ministry declared on Saturday that the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Mark Dubowitz personally, are guilty of “designing, imposing and intensifying the impacts of economic terrorism against Iran” and “seriously and actively trying to harm the Iranian people’s security and vital interests through measures such as fabricating and spreading lies, encouraging, providing consultations, lobbying, and launching a smear campaign.” FDD is “subject to the penalties that are allowed by the ‘Law on Countering the Violation of Human Rights and Adventurous and Terrorist Activities of the United States in the Region.’ ” On Wednesday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry threatened sanctions against people of “various nationalities who are “working with FDD.” It declared that “this foundation is in fact the designing and executing arm of the U.S. administration.”

The penalties are unspecified, but the ministry’s first statement adds: “Needless to say this measure will be without prejudice to any further legal measures that the other administrative, judicial or security institutions and organizations may take in order to counter, prosecute or punish the above-mentioned persons or their other Iranian and non-Iranian collaborators and accomplices.” We don’t think Mr. Zarif plans to sue FDD or send a letter to Interpol. Technically, according to the law cited against us, Mr. Zarif has already coordinated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran’s Intelligence Ministry in developing sanctions against FDD.

The Islamic Republic isn’t the first dictatorship to try to intimidate think tanks and scholars. And Mr. Zarif is hardly an all-powerful figure at home. We suspect his decision to threaten FDD was to show some revolutionary rectitude to those in the ruling elite who aren’t enamored of him. Many are angered by his failure to understand the American political system, which knocked down President Obama’s nuclear deal.

Mr. Zarif and President Hassan Rouhani had sold that accord as a victory: In exchange for short-term, limited nuclear constraints, the West would lift sanctions and Tehran would gain immediate access to tens of billions of dollars in hard currency and longer-term access to global markets worth hundreds of billions. Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s MIT-educated nuclear guru, well understood the enormous nuclear concessions Washington was making in the agreement, but Mr. Zarif didn’t understand America and the nature, depth and bipartisan politics of U.S. sanctions against Tehran.

Since 1979, Democrats and Republicans alike have been confronting and engaging Iran’s theocracy. If Mr. Khamenei wants Mr. Zarif as his foreign minister, the U.S. will deal with Mr. Zarif. But it’s long past time for the Washington foreign-policy community to stop indulging him. Think tanks and other nongovernmental organizations should stop giving him a podium and refrain from their see-no-evil, unofficial “Track II” diplomacy with Iranian emissaries.

[…]

Read Mark and Reul’s piece for The Wall Street Journal here.